If voter preferences depend on a noisy state variable, under what conditions do large elections deliver outcomes "as if" the state were common knowledge?
that information is aggregated for any voting rule if the probability of switch in favour one alternative is strictly greater than the probability of switch away from that alternative for any given change in belief over states. If the preference distribution violates this condition, there exist equilibria that produce outcomes di¤erent from the full information outcome with high probability for large classes of voting rules. In other words, unless preferences closely conform to the jury metaphor, information aggregation is not guaranteed to obtain.
Are large elections guaranteed to correctly identify the alternative preferred by the majority? Existing work invokes Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) to suggest an a¢ rmative answer to the question. According to CJT, while individual members I thank Daron Acemoglu, David Austen-Smith, Steven Callander, Joyee Deb, Tim Feddersen, Roger Myerson, three anonymous referees and many participants in various seminars and conferences for important inputs while writing this paper. All responsibility for any errors remaining in the paper is mine.
of the jury may not have precise knowledge of the defendant's guilt, the aggregate outcome in a large jury under majority rule voting is correct almost surely. However, unlike in the jury set-up, voters in the real world may have substantial diversity of preferences. The main message of our paper is that if there is a con ‡ict of interest among voters such that a change in information a¤ects di¤erent voter groups in opposite ways, there may be coordination problems, and thus elections are no longer guaranteed to deliver the majority-preferred outcome. When preference aggregation is also an issue, large elections may not aggregate information e¢ ciently.
In the canonical Condorcet Jury model, there are two states of the world: the defendant is either guilty or innocent. Jury members get noisy but independent signals about the state. If each member votes his signal, the Law of Large Numbers implies that a majority of the members votes for the correct alternative almost surely if the jury size is large enough. 1 Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) (henceforth FP) provides a game theoretic generalization of CJT. The paper shows that, for any threshold voting rule short of unanimity, large elections approximate the outcome that would have been obtained in absence of uncertainty. In their model, the state is a continuous variable, and, for every voter, the utility di¤erence between alternatives is increasing in the state (the "common values"assumption). In terms of the jury metaphor, they consider the degree of guilt as the state, and while each members of the jury may have a di¤erent "threshold of doubt"at which his preferred alternative switches from acquit to convict, as the guilt increases, everyone's utility from conviction (relative to acquittal) increases. Subsequent work on informational properties of elections (Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999) , Myerson (1998) , Wit (1998) , Meirowitz (2002) , Bouton and Castanheira (2012) , Krishna and Morgan (2010) ) has either considered completely homogeneous preferences or retained the common values feature, i.e., a change in state induces voters to switch only in one direction.
candidate 1 is to the left of candidate 2; in state B, candidate 1 is to the right of candidate 2. Clearly, the extreme leftist voters prefer 1 in state A and 2 in state B while the extreme rightist voters have the exact opposite preference in each state. As a second example, consider a city council voting over a proposal to fund a future public project with increased taxes. The project will not bene…t every citizen uniformly, and there is uncertainty about who is going to bene…t. In state A, the main bene…ciaries live in district 1, and in state B, they live in district 2. While the rich in both districts vote against the proposal, the poor in the two districts have opposed, state-contingent preferences: those in district 1 (2) will support (oppose) the proposal in state A and oppose (support) it in state B. As a …nal example, consider a country voting on a proposal to join the WTO, and suppose there is uncertainty about whether the comparative advantage for the country lies in agriculture or in industry. Under free trade, the sector with comparative advantage will be better o¤ and the other one will be worse o¤. Clearly, those engaged in the agriculture and those in industry will have opposed preference in each state. In our paper, there are two alternatives (P and Q), two states (A and B) and two conditionally independent signals (a and b) much like the canonical CJT. We relax the assumption that all state-sensitive voters agree over what the best alternative is in each state. When individual voter utilities in each state are drawn from a more general distribution, the following is true (in an ex-ante sense) for a randomly chosen voter holding a given belief over states: for an in…nitesimally small increase the in belief he holds, he switches his ranking from P to Q with a certain probability and from Q to P with another probability. We denote these probabilities as "rates of switch" in favor of or against P . On the contrary, under the common values assumption, there is a positive probability of him switching in favor of only one alternative for any change in belief.
We obtain a condition on the distribution of voter preferences that guarantees ef…cient information aggregation for any informative signal structure and any threshold voting rule short of unanimity. The condition is as follows: suppose that under full information about the state, P has more support in state A than in state B. Then, for every prior belief over states held by the randomly chosen voter, the likelihood of him switching from Q to P should be strictly higher than the likelihood of him switching from P to Q. We call this condition Strong Preference Monotonicity (SPM). For every preference distribution that does not satisfy SPM, there exist signal precisions (values of conditional probabilities) that induce equilibria with incorrect outcomes for any voting rule that requires P to win in state A and lose in state B under full information. In these "bad" equilibria, P either wins in each state or loses in each state almost surely. Since SPM is de…ned on the "rate of switch"in favor of or away from P (rather than on the mass of voters that support or oppose P ); the condition is not robust to local perturbations of the distribution of preferences. In all the existing literature including FP, SPM is satis…ed by the assumption of unidirectional shift. Our contribution is to point out that this extreme condition is necessary in a certain sense for large elections to aggregate information.
If the preference distribution violates SPM, there exists a continuum of conditional probabilities over signals for which information is not aggregated e¢ ciently. What can we say about the informational properties of elections given the probability distribution over signals along with preferences? Here, we show that elections are informationally e¢ cient if and only if the following property (Weak Preference Monotonicity -WPM) holds: for every prior belief held by the random voter, a change in signal from b to a leads to a higher likelihood of him shifting from Q to P rather than the other way round. A failure of this property for any belief leads to equilibria that induce wrong outcomes in at least one state. Unlike SPM which is a condition on preferences alone, WPM is a joint property of preferences and signals. A preference distribution satis…es SPM if and only if it satis…es WPM for every signal distribution.
Our result is driven by a single insight: the characteristics of the equilibrium outcome depend on the local properties of beliefs; in particular, they depend on the behavior of the expected vote shares around a given belief. 3 To ensure that all equilibria induce the full information outcome, one must impose a global property on the vote shares that should hold true for all beliefs. SPM is such a property. The intuition for the necessity of SPM is best understood in the following way. For the voters, belief updation is a two-step process: …rst, the prior is updated conditioning on the event of being pivotal (to what we call the "induced prior") and then the …nal posterior is formed based on the signals. Notice that in an equilibrium with symmetric strategies, all voters have the same induced prior. Consider a consequential rule, i.e., a voting rule that, under full information, leads to P winning in state A and losing in state B. The failure of SPM implies that there is some belief where the switch rate in favor of P is higher than the switch rate away from P , and some other belief where the opposite holds. By continuity, for some signal precisions, there exists a belief b for which the expected vote share for P is the same in each state. Now, there is an equilibrium (for any voting rule) where each voter holds belief b conditioning on being pivotal, and it is rational to do so since this belief produces a high likelihood of a tie. In this equilibrium, the vote tally for P is the same in each state: therefore, if the policy P wins (loses) in one state, it wins (loses) in the other state too. Clearly, for a consequential rule, in one state a wrong alternative wins.
The Set-up
There is an electorate composed of a …nite number (n + 1) of people who choose between P (policy) and Q (status quo). P wins if it gets more than a proportion 2 (0; 1) of the votes. 4 A state of nature is S 2 fA; Bg, and the commonly known prior probability of state A is Pr(A) = 2 (0; 1). Given some information I; we shall sometimes refer to the updated probability Pr(AjI) simply as the belief. We shall denote a generic value of the belief by t. The voter receives a private signal s 2 fa; bg which is drawn randomly from a conditionally independent distribution given by Pr(ajA) = q A and Pr(ajB) = q B . We make the usual assumption on informativeness of signals, i.e., 1 > q A > q B > 0. A speci…c pair of conditional probabilities fq A ; q B g will be called signal precisions.
Preferences
Each voter's from Q is normalized to 0. The utility of voter i from alternative P is denoted by the vector U i = fU i (A); U i (B)g; where U i (S) is the utility from P in state S. U i is drawn independently from some atomless distribution over a compact set in R 2 ; the realized value of U i (S) is denoted by u i (S). Voter i strictly prefers the alternative P (Q) in state S if u i (S) is strictly positive (negative). 5 If u i (S) is weakly 4 To simplify the analysis, assume the tie breaking rule that if the policy receives exactly proportion of votes, the status quo wins. 5 For example, suppose there is a proposal for a tax-funded project where each individual i has to pay a proportion of his income y i as tax, and the monetary value of the project for i is ' S i in positive (negative) in each state, then voter i is committed to alternative P (Q). 6 If u i (S) has opposite signs in the two states (i.e., if u i (A)u i (B) < 0), then his ranking over alternatives depends on the state. We refer to such voters as independents. A voter is committed to alternative X 2 fP; Qg with probability X > 0; and is independent with a probability I > 0.
7
There are two kinds of independents: those who prefer policy P only in state A and those who prefer P only in state B. Call the former voters (u(A) > 0; u(B) < 0) the utype and the latter (u(A) < 0; u(B) > 0) the d-type. Notice that in the Condorcet setup, we have only one of these two types. For independents, the intensity of preference (i.e., the realized value u i (S)) does matter for their ranking under uncertainty. For an independent voter, de…ne the quantity i
2 (0; 1) as a function of realized utilities. It is easy to see that a u-type (d-type) voter i holding belief t strictly prefers P (Q) if t > i and Q (P ) if t < i . The only quantities relevant for an independent voter i's behavior under uncertainty are: (i) the cut-o¤ value of belief i 2 (0; 1) where he switches his ranking over alternatives and (ii) the direction of switch x i 2 fu; dg. Instead of using the utility pair fu i (A); u i (B)g; we shall describe an independent voter i's preferences by the pair f i ; x i g. Conditional on a voter being independent, denote the joint distribution over the cut-o¤ belief and the direction of switch by F ( ; x). To be speci…c, F ( ; x) is the probability that a voter has x i = x 2 fu; dg and i 2 [0; 1]. 8 In particular, F ( ; x) is a joint probability distribution and not the distribution of conditional on x i = x. Without loss of generality, we assume that F (1; u) > F (1; d); which implies that the probability that a random voter prefers P to Q in state A is higher than that in state B.
Preferences and signals are private information. Since the partisan voters play very little role in our analysis, we shall focus on F and simply call it the distribution of preferences. The interpretation of F ( ; x) is the following. Consider a random voter who holds belief t. The probability that he is u-type and prefers P to Q is F (t; u); similarly, the probability that he is d-type and prefers P to Q is 1 F (t; d). Thus, the yi > 0 prefer the project in state S: 6 Technically speaking, a voter u(A) = u(B) = 0 is committed to both states, but our assumptions ensure that such voters occur with zero probability. 7 The probabilities P ; Q and I are derived from the atomless joint distribution of U i as
The distribution F over and x can be obtained from the original distribution over U as
. In particular, they must satisfy
total probability that a random voter with belief t prefers P to Q is 1+F (t; u) F (t; d). The marginal density
is denoted by f x (t); and is called the "switch rate" in favor of, or away from P , as the case might be. As t increases, the probability that the random voter with belief t prefers P to Q changes by the "net switch rate"
loosely speaking, for any belief t; there is a density f u (t) of voters switching in favor of P and there is a density f d (t) of voters switching away from P . We make the following assumptions on the distribution of preferences.
A1 For all
2 [0; 1]; the joint distribution F ( ; x) has continuous and bounded marginal densities (switch rates) f x ( ) for each x 2 fu; dg.
A2
The net switch rate satis…es h( ) 6 = 0 at 2 f0; 1g. Moreover, there is no open interval over which h( ) = 0.
Strategies and Equilibrium -De…nition
Our equilibrium concept is symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies. All committed voters have weakly dominant actions: they vote for the alternative they are committed to, irrespective of the signal. A pure strategy for an independent voter i is a function i : [0; 1] fu; dg fa; bg ! fP; Qg. We shall denote the pure strategy as a function i ( ; x; s) 2 f0; 1g which assigns to every tuple ( ; x; s) a degenerate probability of voting for P .Formally, we de…ne our equilibrium in the following way.
De…nition 1 (Equilibrium)
The strategy pro…le where every independent voter i uses i ( ; x; s) is a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in undominated strategies if there is a number
s < and x = d where, for s 2 fa; bg; s is given by
Before proving existence, we explain the equilibrium de…nition. For a strategy pro…le ; …xing a voter i; denote by i the pro…le of strategies played by everybody else. Voter i best responds to a equilibrium pro…le i by forming an updated belief using two pieces of information: (i) her own signal s and (ii) the distribution of signals among other voters given i in the event of a tie. Denote by ; the belief Pr(Ajpiv; i ) over states conditioning on pivotality given i , but not taking into account the signal s. Since this belief is induced by the others'strategies, we call it the induced prior belief. Also, suppose that s is the posterior belief updated given the signal s and the induced prior . The best response to i is to vote for P if < s and against P if > s for the u-type and conversely for the d-type. 9 Therefore, in equilibrium, every voter's strategy is characterized by a pair of cut-o¤s f a ; b g; one for each signal. The equilibrium strategy pro…le satis…es the following condition: for each voter i, the induced prior obtained from the other's pro…le i is exactly equal to ; i.e. Pr(Ajpiv; i ) = . In that case, all voters hold the induced prior ; and the strategy involving cut-o¤s f a ; b g obtained by Bayes rule from is a best response to all other independent voters using cut-o¤s f a ; b g.
Existence
If a randomly chosen voter holds belief t 2 [0; 1], then the probability that he votes for P is given by
The probability that a randomly chosen voter with induced prior votes for P in state S is given by
where s is the posterior belief based on prior and signal s, and V ( s ) is obtained from equation (1) . Note that t(S; ) is the equilibrium expected vote share for P in state S. We shall from now on refer to the function t(S; ) as the vote share function, stressing the dependence of expected vote shares on the shared induced prior belief . 9 Those with = t are indi¤erent between voting for P or Q; but the overall outcome does not depend on the behavior of indi¤erent voters as indi¤erence is a zero probability event by the assumption of non-atomicity of F:
It is important to note that the vote share function depends only on F and fq A ; q B g. Non-atomicity of F in guarantees that V ( ) is continuous, and as a consequence, so is t(S; ) in . Since 0 < P V (t) 1 Q < 1 for all t 2 [0; 1]; we have t(S; ) 2 (0; 1) for all 2 [0; 1].
In order to …nd ; …x i and consider a strategy pro…le i ( ) where the strategy of all voters except i are characterized by cuto¤s f a ; b g which arise from the prior according to Bayes Rule. The probability of voter i's vote being decisive in state S is given by equation (3), where t(S; ) is calculated from equations (1) and (2).
where bn c is the largest integer weakly smaller than n . The fact that t(S; ) 2 (0; 1) guarantees that Pr(pivjS; i ( )) 2 (0; 1), and therefore there is always a positive probability of being pivotal. Conditioning on being pivotal, the likelihood ratio over states is obtained from Bayes Rule as
The belief i induced by the strategy pro…le i ( ) is given by
Pr(pivjA; ( )) Pr(pivjB; ( )) or i = H( ; n; ) 1 + H( ; n; ) where
# By our de…nition of equilibrium, we must have i = . Thus, our equilibrium condition is simply = H( ; n; ) 1 + H( ; n; )
Any solution to this equation is the equilibrium induced prior . Notice that we …nd the equilibrium as a …xed point in the space of beliefs rather than as a …xed point in the space of strategies. Continuity and boundedness of t(S; ) guarantees that H( ; n; ) is continuous and that it is bounded above 0 and below 1 for any given n and . The left hand side of 4, on the other hand, varies monotonically in (0; 1) as changes in (0; 1). Therefore a solution to equation (4) exists, and it characterizes the equilibrium for any (n; ). We denote the equilibrium induced prior by n . Moreover, we have n 2 (0; 1);
by the boundedness of H( ; n; ).
Large Elections and Information Aggregation
In the previous section, we have characterized equilibria for an electorate with a …nite size. In this section, we provide conditions on the distribution of preferences under which large elections are guaranteed to produce outcomes close to the full information outcome. To look at the voting outcome for a large electorate, we hold the preference distribution, signal precision and voting rule …xed, and examine the limit of the equilibrium outcome of the sequence of games as the size of the electorate increases. Thus, we are looking at the limit of n as n ! 1. Since the sequence belongs to a compact interval [0; 1], a limit always exists, which denote by 0 . From condition (4); we obtain the following limit equilibrium condition, which identi…es the limit of the induced prior belief held in a given sequence of equilibria for a voting rule
H( n ; n; ) 1 + H( n ; n; )
For large n; the actual vote share for P in state S is close to the expected vote share t(S; 0 ) with a high probability. Thus, for large enough n; P wins in state S with an arbitrarily high probability if t(S; 0 ) > and loses with an arbitrarily high probability if t(S; 0 ) < . We compare this (limit) outcome given with the full information outcome induced by to see whether information is indeed aggregated in limit of the particular equilibrium sequence. To be able to do that, we …rst formally de…ne (i) full information outcomes and (ii) the standard for information aggregation.
Full Information Equivalence
To study information aggregation properties of an election, we …rst introduce a classi…cation of voting rules according to the outcome under common knowledge of the state in a large election. Denote by V S the expected share of voters who prefer P over Q in state S. In a large election, if the state is known, the actual vote share of P is very close to V S . Since we assume that F (1; u) > F (1; d); equation (1) The yardstick of information aggregation used here is the full information equivalence (FIE) criterion used in FP. An equilibrium sequence of a game de…ned by preference F; signal precisions fq A ; q B g and voting rule is said to be full information equivalent if the limit outcome is the same as the full information outcome in each state with an arbitrarily high probability. Formally, De…nition 2 (Full Information Equivalence) Fix the distribution of preferences F; signal precision fq A ; q B g and the voting rule 2 (0; 1). An equilibrium sequence is said to satisfy full information equivalence if for any > 0, there is some m such that the equilibrium outcome in each state is the same as the outcome under full information with a probability larger than 1 whenever the size of the electorate is greater than m.
We show that information is aggregated in all equilibrium sequences (irrespective of the voting rule and signal precision) if a particular condition on the preference distribution F is satis…ed, which we call Strong Preference Monotonicity (SPM). If F does not satisfy SPM, there exist signal precisions for which, given any consequential rule, the voting game has a sequence of equilibria that produces incorrect outcomes in the limit. 10 Moreover, for any equilibrium sequence that fails to satisfy FIE, an alternative di¤erent from the correct one wins with a very high probability in at least one state. We …rst de…ne and discuss the condition of SPM and then state our main result. SPM is a condition on the switch rates. According to this condition, the switch rate in favor of P is greater than the switch rate away from P for almost every belief. Another interpretation of this condition is the following: if a random voter holds belief t; the probability that he prefers P to Q is strictly increasing in t.
11 The "common values" assumption in FP implies, in the context of a continuous state space, that voters switch only in favor of policy P for any increase in state. Since the state space is binary in our case, we convexify the state space using the belief over state Theorem 1 If the preference distribution F satis…es Strong Preference Monotonicity (SPM), every equilibrium sequence satis…es full information equivalence (FIE). If F does not satisfy SPM, there is some signal precision fq A ; q B g such that for any consequential voting rule (except possibly for a single value of the rule), the sequence of games de…ned by F; q A ; q B and has an equilibrium sequence that fails to satisfy FIE. In this equilibrium sequence, P either wins in both states with probability converging to 1 or loses in both states with probability converging to 1 as the size of the electorate grows.
Given any consequential rule ; information is aggregated along a sequence if, for the limiting induced prior 0 ; we have t(A; 0 ) > > t(B; 0 ); i.e. P wins in state A and loses in state B. Under SPM, we have t(A; ) > t(B; ) for all ; and in particular, the condition for FIE is always satis…ed. On the other hand, if F fails to satisfy SPM, there exist signal precisions q A ; q B and a sequence of equilibria for which t(A; 0 ) = t(B; 0 ) = t. In this equilibrium, P wins in both states if < t and loses in both states if > t. Two comments are in order about the content of the theorem. First, the theorem says that non-aggregating equilibria exist when F violates SPM. For the same parameters that lead to non-FIE equilibria, there may be other equilibria, some of which may satisfy FIE. However, the non-FIE equilibrium sequence we identify in the proof of the theorem (P either always loses or always wins) has a focality property: the equilibrium belief and strategies employed in the limit are independent of the 11 Notice that the probability of the random voter preferring P to Q is given by V (t): Since
; it is easy to see that SPM is equivalent to V (t) being increasing for all t: particular voting rule in use. While there may exist equilibrium sequences satisfying FIE even when SPM is violated, the belief and strategies in such equilibria are very sensitive to the voting rule.
Second, while the theorem only says that there exists some value of signal precision that leads to non-FIE equilibria for each F that violates SPM, outcomes in such equilibria are robust to small perturbations in signal precision. From the construction used in the proof it will be clear that, for any F that violates SPM, there is actually a continuum of such signal precisions for which these non-aggregating equilibria exist. 12 In what follows, we provide the proof of the theorem step by step.
Proof of Theorem 1
As a …rst step of the proof, Lemma 1 identi…es a speci…c relationship between the voting rule and the limit of the induced prior belief 0 . This relationship is necessary to ensure that H(n; n ; ) does not explode to in…nity or go to zero in the limit. 
where m = bn c ; t n A = t(A; n ) and t n B = t(B; n ).
Since m n 1 ; we have m ! 1 as n ! 1. Also, since t(S; ) 2 ( P ; 1 Q ) and m n 2 0; 1 ; there is some 0 < t < t such that t h 
1 < 1 for all n large enough; then lim n!1 H( n ; n; ) = 0: To make sure that the RHS of equation (5) is bounded above 0 and below 1; the condition in the lemma must hold. 12 Suppose F violates SPM. The proof of Lemma 5 actually …nds an such that for any 2 (0; ); there is an equilibrium in which FIE fails for any given consequential rule and signal precisions q A = 
Corollary 1 Fix F; q A ; and q B . If for some ; we have 0 = in some equilibrium sequence and t(A; ) 6 = t(B; ), then it must be the case that = ( ). Moreover,
( ) lies strictly between t(A; ) and t(B; ).
The corollary is easy to verify from Lemma 1. 13 Moreover, this corollary suggests an interesting relationship between voting rules and equilibrium vote shares in large elections, which is empirically testable in principle.
14 Fixing F , q A and q B ; we basically …x the functions t(S; ) for S 2 fA; Bg. Now, for any belief with the property that t(A; ) 6 = t(B; ), corollary 1 identi…es a unique candidate voting rule ( ) such that the sequence of games with F , q A ; q B and ( ) would have a sequence of equilibria with induced prior converging to . 
For a given 2 [0; 1]; consider any sequence n ! . Now, if = 2 ( ); then H( n ; n; ) is bounded away from 1 as n ! 1.
Proof. The proof for case (i) follows from Lemma 1. The statement of case (ii) of the lemma is vacuous. Next, consider case (iii) with the subcase that f u (0) > f d (0). In this case, t . log
single peaked in z and attains its maximum at z = . Now, if > V B ; then for all large enough n; we have > t n A > t n B ; which would imply that (t
1 . In that case, we have H( n ; n; ) > 1 t; for all large n: The subcase with f u (0) < f d (0) and case (iv) follow similar logic.
For a game de…ned by F; q A ; q B and some voting rule = 2 ( ); no sequence n ! satis…es the limit equilibrium condition (6) . We want to show the converse, i.e. that for any and any 2 ( ); there exists a sequence of equilibria n ! .
However, that statement is true only with a few caveats. For the voting rule ( ) to support an equilibrium sequence n ! ; we need to ensure that ( ) is not locally constant at . When ( ) is not well-de…ned, i.e., for a belief such that t(A; ) = t(B; ) = t; any voting rule 2 ( )nftg supports an equilibrium sequence n ! if the vote share functions t(A; ) and t(B; ) "cross" at . To state this formally, …xing F; q A and q B ; we say that a belief 2 [0; 1] is regular if any of the following three conditions holds: (i) 2 f0; 1g; or (ii) t(A; ) 6 = t(B; ) and The "only if" direction follows directly from Lemma 2. The proof for the "if" direction is as follows.
Proof. De…ne the function G n ( ; ) = H( ;n; ) 1+H( ;n; )
. The proof consists of showing that for any regular b ; if 2 ( b ), then there is a sequence of …xed points n of G n ( ; ) such that n ! b . In this proof, we repeatedly use the following result: suppose g(x; y; ) = ) ; we must have G n ( ; ( b )) ! 0 as n ! 1. Therefore, for every n large enough, G n ( ; ( b )) > for = b + and G n ( ; ( b )) < for = b : By continuity, there must exist some ( ; ( b ) ) such that for all n large enough,
Next, consider b 2 (0; 1) such that t(A; b ) = t(B; b ) = t. Lemma 2 suggests that ( b ) = (0; 1): Notice that G n ( b ; ) = for all (n; ). If b = ; consider a sequence n = b for all n; and we are done. Now, suppose b > . 15 By regularity, assume WLOG that t(A; ) t(B; ) is strictly decreasing at b : Consider any > t; and choose small enough such that > ( ) for all 2
Thus, for each n large enough, G n ( ; ) is positive at = b and negative at = b . Therefore, G n ( ; ) must have a …xed point n 2 ( b ; b ). Thus, there exists a sequence of …xed points n of G n ( ; ) such that for any > 0 small enough, n b < for n large enough given any > t. To show the existence of a sequence of beliefs converging to b for voting rules < t; follow an analogous method. Finally, consider the cases with b 2 f0; 1g. If b = 0 and f u (0) > f d (0); then we must have t(A; ) > t(B; ) in some interval (0; ). We also have b = > 0.
By the above method, for any 2 (0; V B ], we can show that for > 0 small enough, there exists a sequence of …xed points of G n ( ; ) in the interval (0; ) that converges to b = 0. The other cases are similar. Lemma 3 allows us to pin down the set of equilibrium outcomes of large elections (given F; and fq A ; q B g) in the following way. Given some 2 (0; 1); …nd the set of beliefs B( ) = f : 2 ( )g. For any regular 2 B( ); there is an equilibrium sequence with beliefs converging to . We can determine the winning alternative in each state S by comparing the relevant vote share t(S; ) with the voting rule . Notice that as long as is di¤erent from t(S; ), we can pin down the outcome in a large election almost surely. Lemma 4 gives us the outcomes depending on the shape of the vote share functions.
Lemma 4 Fix F; q A ; and q B . If V A > t(A; ) > t(B; ) > V B for every 2 (0; 1); all equilibrium sequences satisfy FIE for each voting rule. If for some regular ; we have t(A; ) < t(B; ); then, given the voting rule ( ); there exists an equilibrium sequence for which P loses in state A and wins in state B with high probability. If for any regular 2 (0; 1); we have t(A; ) = t(B; ) = t; then for every > t; there is an equilibrium sequence in which P loses with high probability in each state and for every < t; there is an equilibrium sequence in which P wins with high probability in each state.
Proof. In the online appendix Lemma 4 is a direct outcome of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. The lemma shows that if the vote share in state A is greater than that in state B for every belief, then large elections approximate the full information outcome for all voting rules. If on the other hand there is some belief for which the vote share in state A is weakly less than that in state B and additionally, if that belief satis…es the regularity property, then there is an equilibrium sequence that does not satisfy FIE for a consequential rule (since P either loses in state A or wins in state B). Lemma 5 concludes the proof of theorem 1.
Lemma 5 Fix the distribution of preferences F . If F satis…es SPM, then for each fq A ; q B g; the vote share function satis…es V A > t(A; ) > t(B; ) > V B for every 2 (0; 1). If F violates SPM, there exist signal precisions fq A ; q B g such that the vote share function has the property that v(A; ) = t(B; ) for some regular 2 (0; 1).
Proof. In the online appendix
The two direct implications of SPM are that (i) the vote share in state A is higher than that in state B for any belief, and (ii) the vote share function is strictly increasing in in each state. These implications lead to the conclusion V A > t(A; ) > t(B; ) > V B ; which, according to Lemma 4, is su¢ cient for full information equivalence. If SPM is not satis…ed by some F , by continuity arguments we can …nd signal precisions fq A ; q B g which lead to vote share functions with the following property: there some regular with t(A; ) = t(B; ) = t. By Lemma 4, the game de…ned by F; q A , q B and any 2 (V B ; V A )nftg has an equilibrium sequence that fails to satisfy FIE.
Moreover, the proof of Lemma 5 shows that for each F that violates SPM, there exists a continuum of such signal precisions. The intuition for that is as follows. Suppose, for some F; q A and q B ; there is some at which vote share functions t(A; ) and t(B; ) "cross"each other. By continuity of the vote share functions in fq A ; q B g; if we perturb fq A ; q B g a little bit, we will still have some 0 close to at which t(A; ) and t(B; ) "cross"each other.
Strong and Weak Preference Monotonicity
SPM is a condition on the distribution of preferences alone. Theorem 1 shows that there exist signal precisions that will lead to incorrect outcomes in some equilibria of large elections if preferences violate SPM. However, one may ask the following question: given a signal precision, what can we say about the information aggregation properties of a large election? The next proposition provides a joint condition on preferences and signals which guarantees information aggregation. Moreover, if the condition is violated, there exist equilibrium sequences that do not aggregate information.
De…nition 4 (Weak Preference Monotonicity) Together, a preference distribution F and a signal precision fq A ; q B g are said to satisfy Weak Preference Monotonicity (WPM) if, for all beliefs 2 (0; 1); the following condition is satis…ed
According to WPM, as the signal changes from b to a; for every prior belief 2 (0; 1) held by the randomly chosen voter, the probability of him switching from Q of P is larger than his probability of him switching from P to Q. In other words, a given change in signal always induces a net shift (in probabilistic terms) in favor of the same alternative irrespective of the prior belief. SPM is satis…ed for some preference distribution F if and only if WPM holds for F and each fq A ; q B g such that 0 < q B < q A < 1.
In order to prove the proposition, we need an extra assumption which garantees that for any admissible signal precision, beliefs producing equal vote shares in each state will be regular. If this assumption 
Proposition 1 Suppose assumptions A1; A2 and A3 hold. If F and fq A ; q B g satisfy WPM, then for each consequential rule, every equilibrium sequence satis…es FIE . If they violate WPM, then for each consequential rule (except possibly a single rule), there exists an equilibrium sequence that fails to satisfy FIE. In this equilibrium sequence, P either wins in both states with probability converging to 1 or loses in both states with probability converging to 1 as the size of the electorate grows.
Proof. In the online appendix To see the intuition behind the proposition, notice that WPM is equivalent to t(A; ) > t(B; ) for all 2 (0; 1); which guarantees information aggregation for consequential rules by Lemma 4. If WPM is violated, i.e., if the same change in signal produces a net shift in favor of P for some belief 1 and a net shift away from P for some belief 2 , then, by continuity of the vote share function, there must exist b that produces equal vote shares in each state. Since regularity of b is guaranteed by A3, Lemma 4 tells us that information aggregation fails for almost every consequential rule.
Mandler (2012) shows that information aggregation can fail even in a common values set-up if there is aggregate uncertainty over the signal precision. In Mandler's model, each voter prefers P in state A and Q in state B. The signal precision fq A ; q B g itself is a random variable, and q S (the probability of signal a in each state S) is drawn from a commonly known distribution G S with full support over [0; 1]. Notice that for realizations such that q A < q B ; a change in signal a to b increases the relative likelihood of state A; and for realizations q A > q B , a change in signal a to b decreases the relative likelihood of state A. Therefore, a change in signal from a to b makes every voter more or less likely to vote P depending on whether voters believe that the signal a occurs with a relatively higher frequency in state A or in state B. While WPM in our model is de…ned with respect to …xed signal precisions and varying preferences, essentially what we have in Mandler (2012) is a failure of WPM due to varying signal precisions. The broad lesson that arises from a comparison of these two papers is that irrespective of the source of uncertainty, voting equilibria are driven by the local properties of the relationship between voter beliefs and expected vote shares, and unless a given change in the signal increases (or decreases) vote shares in favor of the same alternative for every belief, information may fail to aggregate.
Conclusion
Our main result tells us that if we want to guarantee information aggregation for every signal precision, the preferences have to satisfy a strong condition, the SPM. According to SPM, the net rate of switch in favour of the alternative P must be strictly positive for almost all beliefs. Put di¤erently, SPM requires that F ( ; u) F ( ; d) be strictly increasing in . Notice that this is not a condition on the absolute mass of switchers but on the net rate of switching. The condition is very fragile in the sense that we can always change the function F ( ; d) over any small open interval (0; 1) of the support and set f d ( ) > f u ( ) over ; and the condition is violated. This feature allows us to present a sense in which SPM is non-generic and its failure is generic. Say that two distribution functions F and G are " close"if the integral of jF Gj is less than some > 0. Now, for any distribution of social preference F and any ; there is some G that does not satisfy SPM. Thus, SPM is non-generic. Moreover, for any F that does not satisfy SPM, we can …nd some small enough such that all functions that are -close to F fail to satisfy SPM. In this sense, the failure of SPM is generic. 16 The bulk of the existing literature on CJT has assumed unidirectional switching, i.e., f d ( ) = 0 for all ; which automatically implies SPM. The point of this paper is to demonstrate that the property of full information equivalence cannot be extended much beyond the jury setting. It is customary to mention here that we have not included "realistic features" of elections such as the possibility of abstention, signaling motivation of voters, unanimity rules, costly information and so on. 17 We have speci…cally excluded these features in order to demonstrate that the central source of aggregation failure is preference con ‡ict, and to indicate the possibility that such con ‡ict may lead to ine¢ cient outcomes in real world elections. . For all such beliefs, t(A; ) > ( ) > t(B; ); i.e., P wins only in state A. For each P -trivial rule < V B , B( ) = f0g. Since t(A; 0) = t(B; 0) = V B > for such rules, P wins in both states. Similarly, for each Q-trivial rule > V A , B( ) = f1g. Since t(A; 1) = t(B; 1) = V A < for such rules, Q wins in both states.
Next, consider some regular such that t(A; ) < t(B; ) and consider the voting rule ( ). By Corollary 1, t(A; ) < ( ) < t(B; ); and the outcome is as described in the Lemma. Similarly, for a regular such that t(A; ) = t(B; ) = t; there is an equilibrium sequence with induced prior converging to for all 2 (0; 1)nftg; and the outcome is as detailed in the Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose SPM holds. We have t(A; ) t(B; ) = (q A q B ) I h R = q S h( a ) + (1 q S )h( b ) > 0. Since t(S; ) is strictly monotonic and t(S; 0) = V B and t(S; 1) = V A ; we must t(S; ) 2 (V B ; V A ) for all 2 (0; 1) and S 2 fA; Bg. Next, assume that SPM fails. Since V A > V B ; it cannot be the case that f u ( ) f d ( ) for all 2 (0; 1). By continuity of f u and f d and by the assumption that f u ( ) cannot be equal to f d ( ) for any open interval, it must be the case that there are three numbers 0 < r < s < t < 1 such that h(s) = 0; and either (i) h( ) > 0 in the interval (r; s) and h( ) < 0 in the interval (s; t), or (ii) or h( ) < 0 in the interval (r; s) and h( ) > 0 in the interval (s; t). WLOG, we consider the …rst case. In order to show that there exists fq A ; q B g that lead to equal vote shares in the two states for some regular ; consider q A = . Notice that for a given 2 (0; 1); j s j is strictly increasing in ; and a > > b . Now, consider any 1 2 (r; s) and 2 2 (s; t). There must be some > 0 such that for all < ; the following is true: at = 1 ; both a and b lie in (r; s); and at = 2 ; both a and b lie in (s; t). De…ne Z( ) t(A; ) t(B; ) = I R a b h( )d . It is easy to see that Z( 1 ) > 0 and Z( 2 ) < 0. Since Z( ) is continuous in ; for every < we must have some e such that Z( ) = 0. Moreover, for = ; since Z( ) = 0; it must be true that b < s < a . Therefore, Z 0 ( ) = I leads to a regular that satis…es t(A; ) = t(B; ).
Proof of Proposition 1
First, consider some 2 (0; 1) such that t(A; ) = t(B; ). In other words, for any fq A ; q B g. Now,
